Social media have quickly become a prevalent channel to access information, spread ideas, and influence opinions. However, it has been suggested that social and algorithmic filtering may cause exposure to less diverse points of view, and even foster polarization and misinformation. Here we explore and validate this hypothesis quantitatively for the first time, at the collective and individual levels, by mining three massive datasets of web traffic, search logs, and Twitter posts. Our analysis shows that collectively, people access information from a significantly narrower spectrum of sources through social media and email, compared to search. The significance of this finding for individual exposure is revealed by investigating the relationship between the diversity of information sources experienced by users at the collective and individual level. There is a strong correlation between collective and individual diversity, supporting the notion that when we use social media we find ourselves inside "social bubbles."
Introduction
The rapid adoption of the Web as a source of knowledge and a social space has made it ever more difficult for people to manage the constant stream of news and information arriving on their screens. Content providers and users have responded to this problem by adopting a wide range of tools and behaviors that filter or rank items in the information stream. One important result of this process has been higher personalization (1) -people see more content tailored specifically to them based on their past behaviors or social networks. Recommendation systems (2) , for example, suggest items in which one is more likely to be interested based on previous purchases, past actions of similar users, or other criteria based on one's past behavior and friends. Search engines provide personalized results as well, based on browsing histories and social connections (3, 4) .
It is common for users themselves to adopt filters in their online behavior, whether they do this consciously or not. For example, on social platforms such as Facebook, a large portion of users are exposed to news shared by their friends (5, 6) . Because of the limited time and attention people possess and the large popularity of online social networks, the discovery of information is being transformed from an individual to a social endeavor. While the tendency to selectively expose ourselves to the opinion of like-minded people was present in the pre-digital world (7) (8) (9) , the ease with which we can find, follow, and focus on such people and exclude others in the online world may enhance this tendency.
While useful, personalization filters -whether they are algorithmic, social, or a combination of both -have biases that affect our access to information in important ways. In one line of reasoning, Sunstein and Pariser have argued that the reliance on personalization and social media can lead people to being exposed to a narrow set of viewpoints (10) (11) (12) . According to this hypothesis, one's existing beliefs are reinforced because they are locked inside so-called "filter bubbles" or "echo chambers," which prevent one from engaging with ideas different from their own. Such selective exposure could facilitate confirmation bias (13, 14) and result in less informed opinions and fertile ground for misinformation (15) (16) (17) (18) .
These concerns are born out in some online user behavior data. For example, on blogs, commenters are several times more likely to agree with each other than not (19) , and liberals and conservatives primarily link within their own communities (20) . On Twitter, political polarization is even more evident (21, 22) . Facebook users, especially partisan ones, are more likely to share articles with which they agree (23) . When browsing news, people are more likely to be exposed to like-minded opinion pieces (24) , and to stay connected and share articles with others having similar interests and values (25) . In the context of controversial events that are highly polarizing, web sources tend to be partial and unbalanced, and only a small fraction of online readers visit more than two different sources (26) . To respond to such narrowing of online horizons, researchers have started to concentrate on more engaging presentation of disagreeable content (27) (28) (29) .
In domains outside of political discourse there is less evidence that personalization and social networks lead to filter bubbles. Recommendation systems have a diversifying effect on purchases (30) , and search engines have been found to have a democratizing effect on the discovery of information, despite the popularity-based signals used in their ranking algorithms (31) .
The filter bubble hypothesis has not been empirically validated and quantified on a large scale, until now. Our goal is to do so by contrasting, for the first time, the biases inherent in different types of online activity: information search, one-to-one communication from email exchanges, and many-to-many communication captured from social media streams. What is the diversity of information sources exposed through solitary information seeking versus interpersonal communication channels, such as social media and email? We answer this question by examining three sources of data about online behaviors: aggregate web traffic, search engine clicks, and link sharing on Twitter (see Methods for details). Fig. 1 illustrates our empirical analysis: we measure how the information sources accessed by people using different types of online activities (search, email, and social media) are concentrated within a few websites or distributed across a broad set of websites. We carry out our analyses on all web targets as well as on targets restricted to news sites, to bring our results to bear on the filter bubble hypothesis in particular. We do not make any additional distinctions regarding the type of content people visit, such as opinion pieces versus reporting, or differing ideological bias. We do not consider beliefs, past behaviors, or specific interests of information consumers. Our results are therefore general and applicable to different topics, geographical regions, interests, and media sources.
Results
The traffic volume in our dataset varies significantly over time and across the three online activities, as shown in Fig. 2(a) . For example, the maximum search volume registered for all targets is close to six times the minimum search traffic and the maximum email traffic. A similar pattern emerges for the dataset of news targets (see inset). These vast volume differences make it necessary to understand the relationship between traffic volume and diversity of an information source. We measure the diversity of a source by its Shannon entropy H = − i p i log p i , where p i is the fraction of clicks requesting pages from website i in the source. We measure the diversity over samples of increasing numbers of clicks. From Fig. 2(b) we see that the diversity measurements indeed depend on volume, especially for small numbers of clicks; as the volume increases, the diversity tends to plateau. To prevent this dependence on traffic volume from biasing the diversity measurements, we compute the diversity over traffic samples of the same size (50,000 clicks per month for all targets, and 1,000 clicks per month for news targets) for each category in our analysis. Fig. 3 (a) presents our main finding: the diversity of social media is significantly lower than that of search engine traffic, for all traffic as well as news targets. The diversity of email traffic shows more variation between target categories -it is significantly lower compared to social media and search for all traffic, but as high as search for news targets, although with a lower level of statistical confidence. Closer inspection of clicks from email reveals that users predominantly tend to be routed to sites such as yahoo.com and live.com. These domain names are owned by companies that offer the services examined here, such as email and search, but they also host big media platforms, and hence were not excluded from the set of targets (see Methods). A large portion of the clicks we observe to these targets are likely the result of browsing actions such as logging out or clicking on the email service's company logo at the top of the page, rather than information seeking or communication. Thus, we believe that the higher entropy observed in traffic from email sources toward news targets is likely a better representation of the diversity of information to which users are exposed when communicating with others through email.
The differences in diversity we observed did not change significantly over a period of three and a half years (see Fig. 3(b) ). This empirical evidence suggests that social media expose the community to a narrower range of information sources, compared to information seeking activities such as search. Fig. 4 illustrates the top targets of traffic from search and social media on a typical week.
While we wish to ultimately understand the biases experienced by individuals, the diversity measurements based on anonymous traffic data do not distinguish between users, and therefore they reveal a collective social bubble, as illustrated in Fig. 1(c,d) . It is at first sight unclear whether the collective bubble implies individual bubbles, or tells us anything at all about individual exposure. The number of clicks per user, or even the number of users could vary to produce different individual diversity patterns resulting in the same collective diversity. In theory, high collective diversity could be consistent with low individual diversity, and vice versa. 
Discussion
Our findings provide the first large-scale empirical comparison between the diversity of information sources reached through different types of online activity. The traffic dataset gives us the unique opportunity to carry out this analysis. We are not aware of any other methods of contrasting different information access patterns produced by the same set of users, in the same time period. We have presented evidence of a collective social bubble: the diversity of information reached through social media is significantly lower than through searching. A similar picture emerges when we specifically look at news traffic -the diversity of social media communication is significantly lower than that of search and inter-personal communication. News consumption is especially important to civic discourse and thus this finding is especially relevant to the filter bubble hypothesis.
Our results suggest that social bubbles exist at the individual level as well, although our evidence is based on the relationship between collective and individual diversity and therefore indirect. Analysis of traffic data with (anonymized) user identifiers will be necessary to confirm this conclusively. Further research is also needed to tease out the influence of social versus algorithmic effects. Both are present in systems like Facebook -the algorithmic effect has to do with how a platform populates the feed for each user, which is presumably determined by a variety of individual and collective signals such as past social interactions and popularity.
It seems unlikely that the relationship between algorithmic and social effects can be extracted from traces of online behavior as done here, without conducting controlled user studies. Finally, in our study all social media traffic and all search traffic is merged. Further work is needed to tease out possible differences in diversity of information accessed through distinct search and social platforms.
While we have found quantitative support of online social bubbles, the question of whether our reliance on technology for information access is fostering polarization and misinformation remains open. Even with ample anecdotal evidence (32), we have yet to fully comprehend how today's technology biases exposure to information.
Materials and Methods

Traffic Dataset
We use click data collected at the edge of the Indiana University network (33) , which allows us to obtain a trace of web requests. Each request record has a target page, a referrer (source) page, and a timestamp. Privacy concerns prevented any identifying information about individual users or clients from being collected, making it impossible to associate any request with any particular computer or person. This collection draws from a diverse population of over 100 thousand people. Our system generated data at a rate of about 60 million requests per day between September 2006 and May 2010, except for 275 days when interruptions of service occurred.
Starting with this dataset we apply several filters and transformations as follows.
1. Non-web page requests, such as to images or JavaScript, are filtered out based on the file extension of the page URL being accessed.
2. The path in the page URL is discarded, leaving only the hostname of the referrer and target for a click. The hostname roughly translates to the website being accessed.
3. Hostnames corresponding to search, social media, and email categories are extracted based on their popularity in our dataset (see Tables 1-3 in Supplementary Materials).
Referrers only from these categories, and targets outside of them are left in the dataset.
The filtering out of search, social media, and email targets is motivated by our interest in novel information people discover. Within-category traffic mainly represents other activities such as refining searches on Google, exchanging comments on Facebook, and so on. Once the dataset is filtered, we have a total of over 134 million records, each representing someone clicking on a link from a search engine, email, or social media.
News Targets
From the filtered click dataset, we built an additional dataset with the targets being only news websites. We crawled a set of news-related directories from the open directory project, yielding lists of newspapers, TV news, etc. A full list of seeds for the crawl is available in Supplementary Materials. We extracted all external links from the crawl, and manually removed links from popular blogging, Wiki and news aggregator sources, RSS and image servers (see the Supplementary Materials for a list of domains that were removed, and more detail on the filtering procedure).
The above procedure results in nearly 3,500 news hostnames. We use this list of news sources to filter the targets in the click dataset, and create the separate news dataset referred in the Results section.
Search Dataset
In the search dataset we have information about search engine sessions from a period of three months in 2006, containing over 18 million queries resulting in clicks from over half a million users.
Social Media Dataset
In the social media dataset we have a sample of almost 1. 
Click Dataset
We use click data collected at the edge of the Indiana University network, which allows us to obtain a trace of web requests (http://cnets.indiana.edu/groups/nan/webtraffic/ click-dataset/). Privacy concerns prevented any identifying information about individual users or clients from being collected, making it impossible to associate any request with any particular computer or person. We only use the traffic coming from self-identified browsers to filter out search engine crawlers and other bots. The data only includes traffic originating inside the Indiana University network and requesting external pages.
This collection draws from a diverse population of over 100 thousand people. Our system generated data at a rate of about 60 million requests per day between September 2006 and May 2010, except for 275 days when interruptions of service occurred.
In the click data it is not possible to distinguish with full certainty requests resulting from human clicks and requests auto-generated by the pages. To address this, we filter out any requests for files other than web pages, such as JavaScript, images, video and so on. This filtering step results in the shrinking of the dataset by a factor of 5, but since it relies on the file extension in the URL which is not always present, it is also not guaranteed to remove all non-human click data. However, it provides a good first approximation of human clicks, and we further address this issue with additional data filtering described later in this section.
Once non-human traffic is removed from the dataset based on the file extension, the path in the URL is discarded so the resulting clicks are only identified by the referrer and target domains. Thus, the referrer and target are roughly equivalent to websites. This level of granularity allows us to address our research questions while avoiding the problem of the sparseness of the web page graph.
To identify the referrers that constitute each traffic category of interest, we examined the most popular referrers in the dataset. The makeup of the categories is shown in Table 1 for search, Table 2 for social media, and Table 3 for email. Once the makeup of the categories was identified, we filtered the dataset to only include referrers from these categories. In addition, we excluded targets from the categories of interest, because we are specifically interested in novel information that people discover. Within-category traffic likely represents other activities, such as refining searches on Google, socializing on Facebook, exchanging emails, and so on.
Likewise, traffic going from one category to another is unlikely to represent the acquisition of new information.
Similar types of traffic that are not relevant to our research question include traffic to ad and image servers, traffic resulting from game playing or using browser applications such as RSS readers, and traffic to URL shortening services. Since it is impossible to exclude all traffic that is not of interest, we focused on filtering out those target hostnames that constitute a significant portion of overall traffic.
We used an iterative procedure in which we examined the top 100 targets for each category and manually identified traffic that is not of interest, or likely constitutes automated traffic not identified by previous filtering. For each category, this was repeated until the list of top 100 hosts was composed of legitimate targets. The set of URLs excluded from the dataset by this procedure is shown in Table 4 .
Once the dataset is filtered, we have a total of over 134 million records, roughly representing someone clicking on a link from a search engine, email, or social media and going to a website outside these three categories.
News-Only Targets in the Click Dataset
The list of news sources we use to filter out non-news related traffic is recovered from a crawl
of the DMOZ open directory (http://www.dmoz.org/) with the seed categories shown in Table 5 . All pages in these categories or any of their subcategories in the open directory are crawled and the links to external websites saved. Following the crawl, the list of news targets is filtered in the following ways.
1. Each URL is transformed to a canonical form and only the host name kept.
2. Hosts falling in one of the predefined categories -social media, search, email -used in other parts of the paper are removed. In addition, URLs from popular blogging platforms (see Table 6 ), Wiki platforms (see Table 7 ), and news aggregators (see Table 8 ) are removed.
3. Host names from a single parent already appearing in the list are collapsed to that parent.
For example, if global.nytimes.com and nytimes.com appear in the list, only nytimes.com is kept. Subsequent checks against this list are done with this in mind, so that all domains derived from the parent match it.
4. An iterative filtering procedure like the one described in Section 1 of this Supplement was applied to remove sites likely constituting RSS, ad serving and similar types of traffic. The list of hosts removed in this way is shown in Table 9 .
Due to the specific research question we are investigating, we believe it is important to make our selection procedure for news targets as open as possible to allow small or less popular news outlets to be included, rather than rely on popular news outlets.
The above procedure results in nearly 3,500 sites. We use this list of news sources to filter the targets in the click dataset, and create the separate news dataset referred in the Results section of the paper. Table 9 : URLs and patterns used to exclude RSS, content serving, and similar types of traffic from the list of news sites. The wildcard symbol * matches 0 or more of any character.
